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Economic Interdependence and Security:




The Clinton Administration believes that high technology
industries are crucial for U.S. military security, competitiveness
in international trade, and domestic economic vigor. Key indus-
tries include telecommunications, computers, electronics, and
advanced materials. Equally prominent are the Administra-
tion's convictions about the desirability of open flows of trade
and investment in the international economy, multilateral coop-
eration to address global problems, and cooperative military
burden-sharing.
Taken as a whole, this agenda is laudable. The challenge is
to identify and pursue policies that contribute positively to at
least some of its elements without adversely affecting others. In
particular, controversy has arisen about the realism of continu-
ing American policies that seek overwhelming national advan-
tage in militarily relevant technology and industry, and, at the
same time, international cooperation and openness with other
industrialized nations.
Recent debate focuses on threats of foreign domination of
generic families of technologies with major civil and military ap-
plications. 1 Protectionists and internationalists tend to agree on
the basic premise that the United States requires access to cut-
ting edge technologies and capacity in the industries related to
them. Otherwise, America will decline in terms of relative -
and perhaps even absolute - economic vigor, political auton-
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1. Michael Borrus & John Zysman, Industrial Competitiveness and Amer-
ican National Security, in THE HIGHEST STAKES: THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF
THE Nux SECURITY SYSTEM 7 (Wayne Sandholtz et al. eds., 1992).
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omy, and military capacity. Protectionists argue for a host of
unilateral measures to defend U.S. technological knowledge as
well as domestic firms and markets. Yet protectionist policies to
avert a future of national decline will impose their own costs on
the U.S. economy and strain or even undermine badly needed
cooperation with major allies. The results, the internationalists
argue, will be the very decline that the protectionists seek to
avoid.
We take the internationalist position with regard to ad-
vanced generic technologies and associated dual-use industries
- industries whose manufacturing capacity and products are
inherently useful for civil as well as military purposes. The pro-
tectionist position is fundamentally flawed in several respects.
It misunderstands the sources of dangerous dependence on for-
eigners, as will be discussed in a later section. Even more fun-
damentally, it does not take into adequate account systemic
changes in the global context in which U.S. policy operates. Yet
the challenges facing U.S. policy can only be understood in light
of those changes.
Little will be gained by making policy for a world that no
longer exists. Current realities are not captured if we only sub-
stitute for the zero-sum military conceptions of U.S.-Soviet mili-
tary rivalry of the Cold War period zero-sum economic
conceptions of U.S. rivalry with Japan and the Asian Newly In-
dustrialized Economies (NIEs). Nor will it suffice to reject that
simplistic view while remaining committed to preserving the
American world role based on unilateral supremacy in military
and technology spheres.2
Internationalists and protectionists do not disagree much
on U.S. national goals of security, prosperity, autonomy, and in-
ternational standing.3 The issues center on how to advance
these goals. In this Article, we argue that the key to achieving
these goals lies in a policy of interdependence with other indus-
trialized nations. We then identify the potential threats that
such a cooperative approach poses for U.S. national interests,
and formulate a policy for dealing with such threats in a manner
which facilitates maximum international cooperation.
2. For discussion of various aspects of these issues, see Symposium,
Searching for Security in a Global Economy, DAEDALus, Fall 1991, at 1.
3. See Davis B. Bobrow and Robert T. Kudre, Midlevel Power Strategies
for Changing International Niches: Experiences in the 'Old World Order," 5 J.E. AsLAN AFF. 237, 240-41 (1991).
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I. SYSTEMIC CHANGES AS POLICY CHALLENGES
The United States no longer occupies the political-military,
economic and technological position that provided a foundation
for its previous trade and investment policies with regard to
high technology. As a result, policies that hitherto were feasible
and desirable in terms of American national goals have lost
some of one or both of those attributes.
The compatibility and priority of relevant national instru-
mental objectives have changed as well. Our industrial competi-
tiveness can no longer rest on obvious technological supremacy.
Technology acquisition can only be harmed by total reliance on
domestic sources. Unilateral efforts will no longer suffice to
deny technology to others. Military technology and military se-
curity needs will no longer offer the inducements they once did
for others to find dependence on the United States necessary
and attractive. The United States must rethink how much it
can "have its cake and eat it too" with regard to military, eco-
nomic, and technological accomplishments.
A. MILITARY CHANGES AND CHALLENGES
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has lessened the pres-
sures on the United States for military modernization and ex-
penditure as well as the benefits from such efforts. The multi-
year defense budget plans of the late Reagan and the Bush ad-
ministrations, yet to be significantly modified in aggregate by
the Clinton Administration, reflect these changes. As measured
in fiscal year (FY) 1991 dollars, the U.S. defense program will
decline from more than 350 billion in FY 1985 to less than 240
billion in FY 1997.4 The justification and feasibility of a large,
purely national, techno-industrial base premised only on mili-
tary modernization and production requirements has declined
accordingly. The United States no longer needs to race as hard
or to produce as massive amounts of military end use items to
sustain military operations.
With the diminution of the threat from the military forces of
the former Soviet Union, support for major unilateral U.S. mili-
tary interventions has declined. Overseas military operations
are increasingly likely to be multilateral affairs. The feasibility
of such cooperative endeavors benefits from standardization and
compatibility in weaponry and even more so in the communica-
4. Jonrr CHIEFS OF STAFF, 1991 JoNr MILrrARY NET ASSESSMENT 3-4
(1991).
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tions and information hardware and software on which multilat-
eral coordination rests. Yet with the decline of the Soviet threat,
the imperatives felt by other countries to "buy American" in or-
der to gain U.S. military protection have declined, just as has
American willingness to subsidize transfers to them.
Further, like the United States, key allies and recipients of
U.S. military products have cut the share of their GDP devoted
to defense spending. From 1986 to 1991 such reductions were
made by major security partners in NATO (Germany, Canada,
Turkey and the United Kingdom), the Pacific (Australia, South
Korea), and the Middle East (Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia).5
Thus, the global defense industry finds itself in dramatic sur-
plus capacity, a surplus worsened by cutbacks in military acqui-
sition in the former Soviet Union.6 That overcapacity feeds
pressures for domestic procurement. Reliance on solely domes-
tic procurement in turn works against the operational compati-
bility of multilateral forces. Yet, the desirability of compatible
military forces remains strong.
These points do not argue for U.S. military inferiority, let
alone for ignoring militarily relevant technology or industry.
Cuts in standing military forces and defense budgets call in-
stead for altered policies to ensure the availability of such tech-
nology and production capacity. Availability can no longer rest
on a massive defense-only industrial base, on massive standing
forces, or - for reasons introduced subsequently - on across-
the-board unilateral supremacy in all relevant aspects of science
and technology. 7
The United States must find a preparedness posture in
which advanced technology provides the defense potential cap-
tured in the phrase "long shadows and virtual swords."8 In ef-
5. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC STATISTICS 30 (1992).
6. See Steven Erlanger, Russia's Workers Pay Price as Military Industries
Fade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at Al.
7. See infra part I.C.
8. Richard L. Wagner, Jr. and Theodore S. Gold, Long Shadows and Vir-
tual Swords: Managing Defense Resources in the Changing Security Environ-
ment, in SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURrrY 53, 53 (Eric H. Arnett ed.,
1990). Wagner and Gold intend "long shadows" to mean a developed and
demonstrated potential, that has arisen as a result of past R&D, to produce and
deploy weaponry in general. This unrealized potential can affect the behavior
of potential adversaries. Consequently, "the R&D casts a long shadow forward,
its influence felt long before any deployment." Id. at 56. "Virtual swords," a
similar concept, means specific weaponry that could be produced or deployed
now as a result of previous R&D but which has not been so produced or
deployed in actuality. Id. at 63.
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fect, relevant technology and manufacturing capacity become a
national strategic reserve. 9
Much of that reserve, as well as improvements in existing
capabilities, will involve technologies that provide relatively in-
expensive force multipliers. Those tend to come from the very
industries - such as electronics, computers, and informatics -
that have important civil applications. Military superiority will
suffer if the United States ignores superior foreign technologies
that can contribute to those force multipliers. It will also suffer
if the firms central to the national defense industrial strategic
reserve are not competitive in civil markets.
Future military superiority will also depend on containing
the financial costs of research and development, and of procure-
ment. Reliance on purely domestic sources is not conducive to
such cost control. With shrinking defense demand, the number
of competing domestic producers of primarily military items will
tend to decline further. The growth of monopoly power at home
is not conducive to competition on quality or price, and thus will
hinder the pursuit of affordable military superiority. Even
before the impact of the U.S. defense budget cuts of the 1990s,
the number of competitive suppliers was very small. A 1990
summary of the number of domestic U.S. suppliers for eighteen
military items found more than two in only three cases.' 0
Major courses of action conducive to holding down the rap-
idly growing costs of military systems all involve constraints on
unilateralism. The formation of research, development and pro-
duction consortia that spread costs and risks across several na-
tional economies amounts to deliberate interdependence. Self-
sufficiency also is reduced by the purchase of cost-effective for-
eign products (finished systems, sub-assemblies, components,
and production equipment) and "renting" technical talent (scien-
9. CARNEGI COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT,
NEW THNKaNG AND AMEICAN DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY 11 (1990)[hereinafter CAR-
NEGIE COMMISSION].
10. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 4, at 5-5. The products involved
were: airborne radars, aircraft engines, aircraft landing gear, aircraft naviga-
tion systems, infrared systems, RPV/Missile/Drone engines, gun mounts, Dop-
pler navigation systems, aluminum tubing, titanium sheeting, titanium wing
skins, titanium extrusions, optic coatings, needle bearings, MILCSPEC-quali-
fled connectors, radomes, image converter tubes, and specialty lenses. Those
with three U.S. suppliers were aircraft landing gear, titanium sheeting, and
MILSPEC-qualified connectors. Id.
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tists and engineers) from others instead of relying on more ex-
pensive or inferior domestic alternatives.11
Warranted reliance on such interdependence rests on confi-
dence in the future behavior of the governments and firms in-
volved. That sort of confidence suffers when protectionist
policies are pursued or are even under serious discussion. The
potential gain from cooperation then seems a utopian illusion.
Doubt gains strength when major powers withdraw or retrench
from long standing joint projects, as with U.S. retrenchment on
the space station and the supercollider. 12
A further goal of U.S. military policy is the denial of technol-
ogy to potentially hostile parties. Yet, the unilateral pursuit of
international market dominance creates new security problems.
Pursuing economies of scale through foreign sales implies the
willingness to transfer the finished products that embody high
technology. Such transfers may enable reverse engineering; at
the very least they usually involve some transfer of know-how
and maintenance/repair capacities.
The global contraction of demand for defense related goods
discussed above means that there is intense competition for for-
eign sales. This competition presses sellers to lessen the sorts of
conditionality the U.S. government would like to impose on buy-
ers' military capabilities, arms control practices, and foreign pol-
icy toward third parties. Sales of technologies and products with
even indirect military applications increase the extent to which
the recipients are in a position to end-run U.S. efforts to deny
military capacity to current or potential hostile third parties.
They may lessen one security problem, by sustaining the United
11. Costs can, of course, be contained by the deliberate use of civil projects,
products and manufacturing capacities for military purposes with associated
lower prices and sharing of research, development, and manufacturing base
costs. Yet, that option only shifts the debate about the value of protectionist
policies to their implications for competitiveness in and technology advance for
civil markets. Civil products and the elements in their production are also
much harder to wrap in the mantle of secrecy and export controls available for
"defense only" matters.
12. See David E. Sanger, Japan Ties Joint Projects to Space Station Plans,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 28, 1991, at C7. Confidence involves identifying the national
institutions with the authority and resources to make and honor appropriate
commitments. U.S. credibility on that score has taken several blows recently.
As the space station episode shows, the government bureau in whose domain
the project lies (NASA) may well have an interest in an interdependent ap-
proach. It promises reduced costs, risk-spreading, and foreign pressures to pur-
sue the project to its conclusion. The bureau wants to create commitments that
make abandonment very difficult. Nevertheless, such self-interested bureaus
may not have ultimate authority
[Vol. 3:61
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States' defense relevant firms and industrial base, while creat-
ing another, e.g., proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Satellite and super-computer sales to China provide but two
examples. 13
B. ECONOMIC CHANGES AND CHALLENGES
The changes and challenges in the military realm are ac-
companied by equally profound changes in the roles of the
United States and others in the world economy. The United
States has become less dominant in many dimensions. 14 Be-
tween 1985 and 1991, the U.S. share of OECD GDP and G-7
GDP declined respectively from 46% to 39% and from 54% to
41% at current dollar prices. Asian NIEs increased their GDP
by 186%, and the United States by 40%.15 The U.S. share of
world imports declined after 1986, while the share of world ex-
ports did no better than hold its own from 1981-91.16 With re-
gard to high technology product exports, the U.S. share fell from
1970 to 1986 from 28% to 22%, while that of Japan increased
from 12% to 24%.17 In semiconductors, U.S. companies share of
worldwide sales declined from 1975 to 1991 from 64% to 36%,
and that of Japanese companies increased from 19% to 50%.18
The United States' share of the worldwide market for data
processing equipment and services declined from 47% in 1984 to
13. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
14. It must be kept in mind, however, that relative U.S. decline and height-
ened competition are not equivalent to absolute national inferiority. See discus-
sion infra notes 63-79 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, more intense
competition in high technologies and the products that follow from them does
mean that the national interest consequences of openness and cooperative ar-
rangements must be taken more seriously rather than automatically be as-
sumed to be benign. See infra part III for a full discussion of the potential
threats posed by a policy of interdependence.
Part of the heightened attentiveness involves greater awareness of differ-
ences of interests between firms of a particular nationality and their home gov-
ernments. Globalized firms may increase their R&D activities, sales, and
market share in ways that in effect reduce their home nation's position on those
factors. An example is the activities of American semiconductor firms in Japan.
15. BANK OF JAPAN, CoMPARATVE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS: JA-
PAN AND OTHER MAJOR COuNTRiEs 25 (1993).
16. Id. at 131.
17. GOVT. OF JAPAN, WHITE PAPER ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 14 (1991).
High tech products are: "aerospace; office machinery, computers; electronic
components; drug, medicines; instruments; electrical machinery." Id.
18. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 5, at 167.
MiNN. J GLOBAL TRADE
38% in 1991,19 while its share of global computer exports fell
from 38.6% in 1980 to 24.2% in 1990.20
Nor have the trends been good with regard to industrial pro-
duction and the machine tools central to it. For 1988-92, U.S.
average annual growth in industrial production was less than
that of the OECD, the G-7, and the Asian NIEs.21 U.S. produc-
tion of machines tools in 1989 was 72% of that in 1980 measured
by value. The comparable performance for Japan was 277%, for
Germany 145%, for China 274%, for Taiwan 415%, and for
South Korea 551%.22 During the period 1981-1990, the United
States also lost ground as compared to other nations in the use
of robots relative to employees in the manufacturing sector. The
historical lead of Japan and Sweden continued, but the United
States was also surpassed by such competitors as Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, and Singapore.23
At the same time, our dependence on the world economy
grew. In foreign trade terms, exports increased between 1987
and 1992 from 5.6% to 7.5% while imports were steady at
9.3%,24 as the economy adjusted to a more sustainable value for
the dollar. Manufactures grew as a share of U.S. exports be-
tween 1970 and 1990 from 66% to 76%,25 and of U.S. imports
from 61% to 73%.26 These are not developments compatible
with low cost protectionism.
Developments at the firm level also saw a decline in auton-
omy with the substantial increase of international strategic alli-
ances. The 1980-84 and 1985-89 periods were characterized by
the following numbers of alliances in key sectors between U.S.
and European and between U.S. and Japanese firms respec-
tively: biotechnology -103 and 178; automotive - 20 and 63;
new materials - 48 and 92; aviation/military - 31 and 103;
information technology - 291 and 388.27 In short, numerous
American firms in technology intensive industries in defense
19. Id. at 201.
20. Id. at 200.
21. BANK OF JAPAN, supra note 15, at 50. The U.S. figure was 1.7%. The
OECD figure was 1.9%, the G-7 figure was 2.9% The Asian NIEs (Korea, Tai-
wan, Hong Kong, Singapore) averaged 7.5%. Id.
22. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 5, at 161.
23. Id. at 163.
24. BANK OF JAPAN, supra note 15, at 151.
25. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 5, at 132.
26. Id. at 184..
27. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-ITE-569,




relevant sectors have decided that competitiveness requires in-
terdependence and ongoing commitments to foreign firms. In
making those alliances, they have been betting against the rise
of protectionism bearing on investment and research and devel-
opment as well as trade. At the same time, the alliances carry
with them clear prospects for technology diffusion and global
sourcing.
C. TECHNOLOGY CHANGES AND CHALLENGES
With regard to technology per se, we are well into an era
marked by the erasure of the line between cutting edge civil and
military technology, and the diffusion of global technology com-
petence and aspiration.
The changes to dual-use from only military or only civil
technology are well illustrated by micro-electronics technology
such as integrated circuits. In the micro-electronics industry,
the 1990s, unlike the 1960s, finds defense users and markets to
be relatively minor. More generally, between 1960 and 1990,
the share of U.S. research and development (R&D) spending
funded by the Department of Defense fell from one-half to one-
third. The share of Western industrialized world R&D funded
by the U.S. Department of Defense declined from one-third to
one-sixth. In the United States, R&D spending by industry qua-
drupled in real terms, with only a doubling in national govern-
ment spending.28
This essential pattern is not unique to microelectronics.
The dominant technology role is now played by civil applications
in industries which have diffuse global production and which are
central to the economic growth of many countries. This means
that technology development and acquisition will be driven
largely by civil motives which are globally strong.
The implications are varied and important. First, denial of
relevant technology will not be primarily a U.S. choice or a gov-
ernment choice. Attempts to deny the technology imply denying
civil economic development. Second, the industrial base for mili-
tary applications will be no stronger than the civil competitive-
ness of the relevant industries. Costs of the relevant technology
to defense establishments will only go up with civil firm ineffi-
ciency and Will moderate from competitive pressures on that in-
dustry. Requiring industries to use more expensive or inferior
domestic products carries a bill for product competitiveness and
28. CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 11.
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defense costs, and perhaps for military performance. Most gen-
erally, it becomes increasingly less viable to draw a fence around
defense relevant technology and industry for special protection-
ist, nationalistic treatment.
Accordingly, attempts to block the globalization of defense
relevant firms amount to hindering the competitiveness of major
industries in domestic and foreign civil markets. As a practical
matter, the pursuit and achievement of military and civil tech-
nology and manufacturing excellence are inextricably tied
together.29
At the same time, it is increasingly clear that no single
country or its firms can rely on a high technology monopoly.30
Instead, each nation must compete globally by using the world's
technology as its own resource. 31 This is particularly a change
for the United States, and there is no reason to expect it to be
reversed.32
Of the twenty-one critical technologies identified and as-
sessed by the Department of Defense in 1991, there are none in
which the United States leads our NATO allies in "all important
respects."33 Japan leads in some aspects of five (machine intelli-
gence/robotics, photonics, semiconductor materials and
microelectronic circuits, superconductivity, and biotechnology
materials and processes), and matches the United States in
three others (composite materials, high energy density materi-
als, and simulation and modeling). NATO allies match the
United States in seven (air-breathing propulsion, composite
materials, machine intelligence/robotics, biotechnology materi-
als and processes, high energy density materials, simulation and
29. See DAVID B. FRIEDMAN & RICHARD J. SAMUELS, M.I.T. JAPAN PROGRAM,
How To SUCCEED WITHOUT REALLY FLYING: THE JAPANESE A!RCRAFr INDUSTRY
AND JAPAN's TECHNOLOGY IDEOLOGY (1992).
30. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, National Interests in an Age
of Global Technology, in PROSPERING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Thomas H. Lee &
Proctor R. Reid eds., 1991).
31. See Thomas J. Welch, Technology Change and Security, 13 WASH. Q.
112 (1990).
32. See Yuzo MURAYAMA, M.IT. JAPAN PROGRAM, HIGH-TECH WEAPONS,
DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCE (1992).
33. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN 1-3 (1991). The
technologies were: air-breathing propulsion, composite materials, machine in-
telligence/robotics, passive sensors, photonics, semiconductor materials and
microelectronic circuits, sensitive radars, superconductivity, biotechnology
materials and processes, computational fluid dynamics, data fusion, high en-
ergy density materials, hypervelocity projectiles, parallel computer architec-
tures, pulsed power, signal processing, signature control, simulation and
modeling, software producibility, weapons system environment. Id.
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modeling, and weapon system environment).34 In the others,
both Japan and NATO allies have at least some promising activ-
ity.35 In still another critical technology, that of flexible manu-
facturing, 36 Japan and the NATO allies hold "possible
leadership in some niches of technology" and are "capable of im-
portant contributions" in two of four key elements and "may be
capable of contributing in selected areas" of the other two.37
Trends in relative standing with respect to future R&D and
product introduction are also germane. U.S. Department of De-
fense assessments of eleven emerging technologies with respect
to U.S. and Japanese performance 38 find a relative U.S. decline
for future R&D in five (advanced materials, biotechnology, digi-
tal imaging technology, sensor technology, and superconduc-
tors). With respect to future product introduction, the United
States is expected to slip in eight (advanced materials, advanced
semiconductor devices, biotechnology, digital imaging technol-
ogy, high density data storage, high-performance computing,
opto-electronics, and superconductors). Products are, of course,
the military and civil payoffs from new technology, and accord-
ing to the Department of Defense, the United States is ahead in
only three - artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and high per-
formance computing. 39
Japanese government assessments give more primacy to the
United States, and the Department of Defense may have obvious
parochial reasons to overestimate rather than underestimate
Japan's achievements and potential. Yet even Japan's Science
and Technology Agency survey of twelve emerging technolo-
gies40 finds Japan ahead in three (advanced semiconductor de-
vices, high-density data storage, and flexible computer-
34. Id.
35. Id. at Annex B, 1-16, 2-12, 3-12, 4-13, 5-11, 6-14, 7-15, 8-19, 9-14, 10-8,
11-12, 12-14, 13-13, 14-21, 15-13, 16-9, 17-13, 18-15, 19-12, 20-10, and 21-13.
36. The Department of Defense defines flexible manufacturing as, "[t]he
integration of production process elements aimed at efficient, low cost operation
for small, as well as high, volume part number variations, with rapidly chang-
ing requirements for end product attributes." Id. at 1-3.
37. Id. at Annex B, 21-13.
38. JoH-rr CHMFS OF STAFF, supra note 4, at 5-4. The technologies are: ad-
vanced materials, advanced semiconductor devices, artificial intelligence, bio-
technology, digital imaging technology, computer-integrated manufacturing,
high-density data storage, high-performance computing, opto-electronics, sen-
sor technology, and superconductors. Id.
39. Id.
40. GoV'T OF JAPAN, supra note 17, at 5. The technologies are: "biotech-
nology, medical devices and diagnostics, advanced materials, superconductors,
advanced semiconductors devices, digital imaging technology, high-density
1994]
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integrated manufacturing)4 ' and equal in five others (advanced
materials, superconductors, digital imaging technology,
optoelectronics, and sensor technology). 42 Japan is viewed as
gaining relative to the United States in all but the three areas in
which it is held to be ahead already, and holding its lead in
those.
These judgments suggest that simple protectionism may
deny to the U.S. government and U.S. firms the advanced tech-
nology associated with products that are superior in terms of
uniqueness, quality, and cost. Yet equality or even superiority
in those terms is essential to military strength and civil
competitiveness. 43
Some aggregate patterns reinforce the sense of America be-
ing overtaken. By 1985, Japan and Germany at least matched
the United States in share of GNP devoted to R&D and have
continued to do so. 44 As long ago as 1971, those countries
passed the United States in the percentage of GNP devoted to
non-defense R&D.45 In constant dollars, the Japanese increase
in non-defense R&D for the 1980s amounted to 69% and that of
the United States to only 21%. While U.S. government spending
for R&D concentrated on defense (66% in 1989), the Japanese
(5%) and Germans (22%) had different priorities. 46
Patents granted by the United States showed a substantial
shift toward foreigners, and especially the Japanese from 1970
to 1989. The 1970 percentage for all foreigners was 27% (4%
Japanese). 47 In 1989, for all foreigners it was 47.5% (Japanese
21.1%). That same year, foreigners were awarded only 13.5% of
the patents granted in Japan (U.S. 6%).48
In the military, economic and technological context we have
sketched, the United States stands out for its predominantly
data storage, high-performance computing, optoelectronics, artificial intelli-
gence, flexible computer-integrated manufacturing, and sensor technology." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. FUMno KODAMA, ANALYZING JAPANESE HIGH TECHNOLOGIES: THE
TECHNO-PARADIGM SHIFT (1991).
44. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS - 1989
287 (1989); GOV'T OF JAPAN, INDICATORS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1993 16
(1993); AGENCY OF INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, TRENDS OF PRINCIPAL
INDICATORS ON RESEARCH AND DEELOPMENT ACTrvrrIES IN JAPAN 3 (1991).
45. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 44, at 288.
46. AGENCY OF INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 44, at 34.
47. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 44, at 356.
48. GOVT OF JAPAN, supra note 44, at 160-161.
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outward flow of technology to its major competitors, 49 especially
Japan. In 1988, the ratio of U.S. technology exports to imports
was 5.24 to 1, while for Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and
the Federal Republic of Germany, the ratio was less than one.50
In 1989, the United States provided almost two-thirds of Japan's
technology imports while receiving about one-third of Japan's. 51
The net outward flow from the United States to Japan was par-
ticularly pronounced in key dual-use sectors. The ratio of Japa-
nese to U.S. technology transfers was: ceramics .30; electronics
and communication .26; non-motor vehicle transportation .02;
and precision instruments .04.52
II POLICY CHOICES
A. THE NATIONALIST TEMPTATION
It is hardly surprising that the changes and challenges just
sketched have led to vigorous support in some quarters for poli-
cies to maximize self-sufficiency in defense-related R&D, trade,
and direct investment. The advocates of such measures pursue
a vision in which all R&D and production is performed in the
United States by domestic firms. This aims to avoid asymmetric
dependence and to provide enhanced U.S. national security
through comprehensive technology leadership and defense in-
dustrial capacity with positive spillovers to the civil sector.
Congressional initiatives linked to Defense Department,
foreign economic policy, and industrial policy bills have called in
a variety of ways for "buy American" requirements. The initia-
tives have focused on such measures as constraints on interna-
tional defense industrial cooperation, denial of incoming direct
investment in defense-related firms, and restriction of R&D
funds to work conducted in the United States and even to only
U.S.-owned organizations. The Exon-Florio Amendment 53 gives
the President authority to block incoming foreign direct invest-
ment for (otherwise unspecified) "national security" reasons.5 4
49. Concerns about the threats to technology leadership posed by the ef-
forts of others are compounded by apparently exceptional U.S. generosity in
sharing the fruits of its R&D efforts.
50. AGENCY OF INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 44, at 54.
51. Id. at 44.
52. Id. at 53.
53. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 110-418,
tit. V, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (amending the Defense Production Act of
1950, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (1988)) [hereinafter Exon-Florio Amendment].
54. See generally, Edward M. Graham & Michael E. Ebert, Foreign Direct
Investment and U.S. National Security: Fixing the Exon-Florio Process, 14
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The Sematech consortium to boost U.S. semiconductor compe-
tence, which is partially supported by the Pentagon, bars foreign
participation.55
Bills introduced in the 101st Congress indicated a desire for
more protection. The Walgren Amendment 56 to the Defense
Production Act of 195057 tried to extend Presidential takeover
authority to "essential technologies," while the Dixon bill58
sought to amend the same legislation to give the President
broad authority to "shape defense preparedness programs and to
take appropriate steps to maintain and enhance the defense in-
dustrial and technology base."59
The most prominent economic (i.e. wealth-increasing) argu-
ments for these lines of policy rest on some version of "strategic
trade theory." Assume that nation A (usually Japan) has a sub-
stantial domestic market and an advanced technology industry
in a dual-use area with significant economies of scale and impor-
tant cumulative learning curve effects. Assume further that na-
tion A effectively shields its innovative enterprises from
effective competition and provides them with competitive advan-
tages. Nation A's firms will come to dominate because they will
serve a world market, while U.S. firms will be handicapped by
access only to a part of the world market and perhaps by other
competitive disadvantages. If these conditions persist, the eco-
nomic implications for U.S. competitiveness may well involve a
spiral of decline, and the ultimate defense implications are also
plain. The decline will sooner or later translate into inferiority
in the development, prototyping, manufacturing and production,
and product improvement stages for defense relevant dual-use
technologies. 60
WoRLD ECON. 245 (1991) (discussing the background of the Exon-Florio
Amendment).
55. See generally, LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE
CoNFLIcT IN HIGH-TEcHNOLOGY INmusrmis 149-54 (1992) (discussing the Se-
matech project).
56. H.R. 5225, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1990).
57. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061-2170 (1993).
58. S. 1379, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1989).
59. Id.
60. Many analysts characterize the technology life cycle as composed of five
rather distinct stages: basic research, development through prototyping, manu-
facturing and production, product improvement, and maintenance and repair.
In general, the keys to the objectives previously set out lie primarily in the
stages of development through prototyping, manufacturing and production. A
nation's relative and absolute performance in these stages will determine per-
formance in product improvement.
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This perilous defense prospect arguably warrants national-
ist policies even in the face of persuasive arguments against
strategic trade policies on narrowly economic grounds: risks of
lower national income following a reduction of nationally gainful
trade, higher costs of capital, greater national R&D burdens,
and foreign retaliation. But most analysts doubt that the U.S.
Government will be able to pick out truly critical technologies
and industries and that U.S. politics will allow for a regime that
discriminates in favor of selected industries for special protec-
tion from foreign involvement.6 1
B. PRAGMATIC INTERNATIONALISM BASED ON AMERICAN
STRENGTHS
Another set of views finds the nationalist measures a policy
mirage, albeit one that may be useful for bargaining purposes.
As indicated earlier, we favor this view. We advocate the crea-
tion of a level playing field for an international defense-relevant
technological and industrial community within the advanced in-
dustrialized democracies. This calls for positive policies, de-
tailed below, to achieve a satisfactory outcome across those
national objectives that remain viable. Otherwise, security co-
operation will suffer, the United States will miss out on attrac-
tive technology, and U.S. industry will lose opportunities in
foreign markets and the increased competitiveness associated
with globalization. This policy impulse is manifest in the Nunn-
Quayle legislation 62 for cooperative defense projects.
It is crucial to note that we do not advocate accepting inter-
dependence out of weakness. Before choosing a policy direction,
we must remind ourselves of some major American strengths
for successful rather than submissive interdependence.
Strengths in the military area are most obvious. Massive
defense budget and force reductions cannot deny U.S. standing
as the predominant military power in the world. The U.S. lead
in many defense products is substantial. Furthermore, turbu-
61. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Is Free Trade Passe?, 1 J. ECON. PERSPEC-
TIvEs 1 (1987); J. David Richardson, The Political Economy of Strategic Trade
Policy, 44 INT'L ORG. 107 (1990).
62. The Nunn-Quayle-Warner Amendment called for equal financing of
codevelopment projects with NATO allies. Department of Defense Authoriza-
tion Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145, § 1102, 99 Stat. 583, 708 (1985) (amending
the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2767). The Nunn-Quayle Amend-
ment inserted "or for procurement by the United States of munitions from the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization or a subsidiary of such organization" after
"member country" in clause (C) of 22 U.S.C. § 2767(bX1XC) (1990).
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lence and uncertainty in much of the world continue to create
non-trivial appetites for U.S. security relationships.
In the economic area, relative decline is only that. Scale
still matters. The United States remains the world's largest sin-
gle economy, exporter, and importer in absolute terms.63 The
rate of growth in its export volumes surpassed that of each of the
other G-7 countries in each of the years from 1987 through
1991.64 As of 1991, North America provides by far the world's
largest national market for data processing equipment and serv-
ices.65 The United States provides the world's largest market
for telecommunications equipment and services, 66 and machine
tools. 67 In the decade from 1980 to 1990, American share of
global exports of high technology products increased in
microelectronics (18.3 to 27.5%), telecommunications equipment
(10.9 to 15.9%), aerospace (47.6 to 50.3%), medicine and biologi-
cals (11.4 to 13.5%), and organic chemicals (13.9 to 14.9%).68
The U.S. national share in computers and scientific/precision
equipment remained larger than that of any other country.69
These are hardly signs of a fundamental and general loss of
competitiveness in high technology products. The growth of cor-
porate international strategic alliances surely follows in part
from the attractiveness foreigners find in American skills, pro-
duction technologies and markets. Those alliances cost both the
foreign countries and the United States some autonomy.
With regard to the U.S. technology base, there are also sig-
nificant strengths. U.S. 1992 R&D expenditures in purchasing
power. parity terms equaled the combined expenditures of Ja-
pan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, 70 as did the
number of researchers.71 Even during the period of priority for
defense spending of the mid-1980s, the United States was able
63. BANK OF JAPAN, supra note 15, at 1, 129, 130, 131.
64. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 5, at 51.
65. Id. at 166.
66. Id. at 201.
67. Id. at 203.
68. Id. at 200.
69. Id.
70. GoV'T OF JAPAN, supra note 44, at 3; BANK OF JAPAN, supra note 15, at
193-94. It should be noted that "revisionists" contend that the U.S. and the
Japanese governments have underestimated R&D spending by the Japanese
private sector which would allegedly bring Japan at least to a matching level.
See William J. Broad, In Realm of Technology, Japan Seizes a Greater Role,
N.Y. TndEs, May 28, 1991, at C1.
71. Gov'T OF JAPAN, supra note 44, at 10-11.
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to outspend Japan on non-defense R&D by about 1.8 to 1.72 U.S.
manufacturing firms during the 1980-91 period did not fall be-
hind a surging Japan in the percent of net sales spent on R&D,
and Japanese firms show signs of pulling back on R&D expendi-
tures.73 Foreign demand for U.S. technology in terms of the ex-
cess of exports over imports74 surely indicates strength as well
as a lack of protectiveness.
Indeed, there is evidence which suggests that a shift to pro-
tectionism would have particularly adverse impacts on the high
technology parts of the American economy. Those are the parts
of American manufacturing that stand out for the portion of
their products exported (by a ratio ranging from 1.5:1 to 2:1 for
1978 through 1986).75 High-tech is the sector of U.S. trade in
manufactures for which exports and imports have been in rough
balance rather than deficit.76 While that balance has weakened,
the United States has still maintained a predominant share of
its home market for domestic producers. 77 An open flow of inter-
national investment also has been more important for the U.S.
high tech industry than for other parts of the U.S. economy. By
the mid-1980s, high tech manufacturers had 42% of their assets
in foreign affiliates, 78 compared to only 30% for other types of
manufacturing firms. 79
In sum, the United States retains the central role in the
world high technology system and in its trade and investment
elements. It stands to lose by high-technology protectionism in
research and development, trade, and investment - as do its
Japanese and European competitors. By contrast, a policy of in-
terdependence stands to benefit the United States both domesti-
cally and in the global market.
III. TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND FOREIGNNESS
What does interdependence as a central element of U.S.
strategy imply for trade and investment policy? How can the
cooperative course meet objections that it involves unacceptable
72. NATIONAL'SCIENCE BoARD, supra note 44, at 288.
73. GovT OF JAPAN, supra note 44, at 150; Andrew Pollack, Japanese, in a
Painful Recession, Trim Industrial Research Outlays, N.Y. TmEs, Nov. 29,
1993, at. Al.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
75. NATIONAL SCMNCE BOARD, supra note 44, at 376.
76. Id. at 379. Data are for 1970-87.
77. Id. at 374.
78. Id. at 155.
79. Id. at 381.
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and avoidable costs by inducing U.S. dependence on others, er-
oding technology supremacy, and reducing military
sustainability?
In a world of limited international cooperation, it is surely
necessary to be alert to threats of foreignness to national objec-
tives. Much of the putative threat is held to lie in the areas of
trade and incoming foreign direct investment separate from, or
in association with, technology monopoly. Understanding the
ways in which the foreignness of trade and investment affect
U.S. national objectives suggests the need for remedies, and the
need to avoid endangering the benefits from cooperation in de-
fense relevant technology.
A. BASIc THREATS OF FoREIGNNEss
Three categories of threat from foreignness in trade and in-
vestment require attention: monopoly, foreign ownership, and
foreign location. We will discuss them in this section, and then
turn to some policy proposals for constraining the threats they
may pose.
1. Monopoly
Total monopoly allows for denying supplies at the discretion
of the monopolist and charging exorbitant prices. Reality is usu-
ally characterized by some degree of less than total monopoly.
The degree of monopoly, usually indexed as the level of price
above marginal cost, is partly a function of the concentration of
sellers, i.e., the extent to which a few firms or governments con-
trol a high percent of the total market, thereby facilitating collu-
sion. The other critical ingredient consists of barriers to entry
and exit - advantages that keep other firms from dissolving the
position of those exploiting market power. The threat to na-
tional security from monopoly power is then three-fold. The first
is that of commercial exploitation through the price mechanism.
The second is the capacity to maintain barriers to entry and exit
and thus make others politically dependent on the continuing
goodwill of the monopolistic supplier. The supplier can set con-
ditions that interfere with the autonomous pursuit of national
security capabilities and their application. The third is the dis-
cretion of the monopolist to supply security goods and technolo-
gies to third parties, thus strengthening their relative security
position against other purchasers. The capacity to eschew ex-





In the absence of substantial monopoly power, foreign own-
ership of firms located in another country affords little more
than an information gathering opportunity for those firms, in-
cluding an opportunity for technology acquisition. It is not obvi-
ous, however, that it provides a uniquely superior means to
acquire technology compared to other mechanisms ranging from
unrestricted access to technological information to facilities
gained by licensing arrangements. Restrictions on incoming in-
vestment hardly obstruct technology diffusion if other channels
of access to the technology base are largely open, as they are in
the United States. Much of the output of the U.S. research es-
tablishment, particularly that produced in the universities, goes
immediately into the public domain. Further, firms license their
technologies without any government interference unless they
have immediate and direct military relevance.
3. Foreign Location
Aside from considerations of monopoly or ownership, loca-
tion of production in other countries may endanger military sup-
plies by exposing the importer to delay or interdiction by foreign
powers. Delays or more permanent disruption could even arise
in an unconcentrated industry consisting entirely of domestic
firms with foreign operations. The problem becomes more likely
as the firms are spatially concentrated in a single foreign loca-
tion, particularly if it is distant and lanes of transit must pass
through geographic bottlenecks. In the absence of monopoly, the
supply cut-off threat can be invalidated by stockpiling measures
proportionate to demand during the cutoff period and does not
require trade or investment controls. Stockpiles may consist of
finished products, components and sub-assemblies, raw materi-
als, or production capacity (e.g., cold lines of machine tools).
Stockpiling does not counter another threat from foreign lo-
cation, that of spillover reduction. Economic activity can have
positive spillover effects (externalities) that decline sharply with
geographic distance. Unappropriable gains in knowledge and
human capital may occur abroad even when foreign production
is owned by domestic firms and where a high level of competi-
tion prevails. Also, the R&D activities of firms may be consid-
ered as an independent form of production whose output is not
fully embodied in the products subsequently produced. Foreign
location of R&D then becomes a distinct concern with possible
security implications.
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B. SumMARY
Most of the threat of foreignness comes from a combination
of two or more of the three characteristics discussed above,
rather than from one of them in isolation. Some substantial
level of monopoly power combined with foreign ownership forms
most of the basis of the threat to national security. Monopoly
power can have negative consequences whether exercised by a
foreign or a domestic owner. Yet the U.S. government has legal
means to assure supply even from a foreign monopolist when its
operations are located in the United States through the Act of
October 6, 1917 ("Trading With the Enemy Act")80 and the Inter-
national Emergency Economy Powers Act of 1976 (IEEPA).8 1
The special emergency measures do not apply when the
source of supply is located outside U.S. jurisdiction. Moreover,
because incoming foreign direct investment (IFDI) - unlike im-
portation - almost necessarily involves some irreversible in-
vestment, some human and physical capital formed by the
foreign investor becomes sunk cost, and its partial redeployment
by the host jurisdiction is possible. This creates host leverage in
case of conflict between the host country and either the foreign
investor or its home government. Some residual supply capacity
may well remain even in cases where disputes are not resolved.
Nevertheless, foreign firms, even within U.S. jurisdiction, are
open to influence by their home country governments. The
threat of purely commercial exploitation including choices of de-
velopment and product line emphasis and policy manipulation
are lessened but not eliminated by firm location in the United
States.
80. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1990).
81. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1976). Under section 5(b) of the Trading With
the Enemy Act, the President may "investigate, regulate, direct and compel,
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use,
transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing
in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to or transactions
involving, any property in which any foreign country or any national thereof
has any interest..." 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b).
Because the original focus of this legislation was wartime enemies of the
United States and its use for other purposes was merely allowed as an apparent
afterthought, perhaps subject to presidential abuse, the Congress passed
IEEPA. While court interpretations of the Trading With the Enemy Act had
allowed the President to take title to foreign property, IEEPA, which applies to
situations short of war, only allows for seizure and operation, not actual owner-
ship. 50 U.S.C. § 1702. See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN
DIREcT INvEsTmENT n THE UNITED STATES 105-06 (2nd ed. 1991).
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We conclude that each type of foreignness poses some dan-
gers, but not completely unmanageable ones. Questions then
arise about how much increasing interdependence should be
avoided and how much it should be pursued with the safeguard
of particular threat-constraining policies.
IV. DEVELOPING NATIONAL POLICY
Both the nationalist and internationalist schools agree that
positive policy measures are needed in the new global environ-
ment. They disagree on what outcomes are feasible and of
greatest priority, and thus on what means are wise. Analysts
favoring a greater level of cooperation in security-relevant R&D,
direct investment, and trade have advanced several proposals
for reconciling interdependence with U.S. security.
A. CONCENTRATING ON CONCENTRATION
Theodore Moran seeks to gain the benefits of cooperation
while avoiding the threats of foreign monopoly power.8 2 The
key is the threshold of concentration that warrants nationalist
measures. Moran advocates a "4/50" rule.8 3 That is, a prima
facie case for various government interventions, outlined below,
exists when either four firms or four countries account for fifty
percent or more of the arms-length market for any good or ser-
vice important for military purposes.8 4 Concentration below the
level of his rule "denotes the absence of any rationale for pre-
serving the local producers,"8 5 even when the viability of domes-
tic production is endangered.
Under Moran's proposal, foreign firms should be given an
open opportunity to participate in publicly-funded R&D so long
as the R&D takes place in the United States and subsequent
foreign siting of production is located outside the foreign firm's
home country or any of the four largest national production sites
- if four countries or four companies supply more than 50 per-
cent of the arms length world market.86
With respect to IFDI, a market not falling within the stric-
tures of the rule should be open to all comers. A friendly take-
over would generally be allowed if R&D and production
82. Theodore H. Moran, The Globalization of America's Defense Industries:
Managing the Threat of Foreign Dependence, 15 INT'L SECURITY 57 (1990).
83. Id. at 82-83.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 85.
86. Id. at 83.
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remained in the United States, or if production was to be moved
to an offshore site that was neither the investor's home country
or one of the top four producing countries. Otherwise, the "4/50
Rule" could be used to block it. s7
Moran stresses that his approach needs refinement and ad-
mits problems of output classification by standard industrial
classification (SIC) categories. These are very serious problems.
In determining SIC categories, the Census Bureau must gather
data from individual firms. It therefore uses definitions corre-
sponding to firms' production classifications rather than the
substitution-in-use criterion which comes closest to the econo-
mist's view of a product as defined by a gap in the chain of sub-
stitutes.8 8 Moran does not discuss these difficulties.
The SIC system provides data on domestic production con-
centration at various levels of aggregation from two-digit "indus-
try groups" to seven-digit "product" or "commodity" categories.
Within each larger category, there may be considerable concen-
tration variation in constituent subgroups.8 9 Moreover, the data
requirements of Moran's proposal differ in two ways.
First, Moran proposes world-wide concentration ratios that
would necessarily be based on somewhat incomparable national
data. Further, data such as those gathered by the Census Bu-
reau are for production only, and the data draw no distinction
between foreign and domestic owners. To gain a picture of con-
centration in the domestic market it is necessary to subtract ex-
ports and add imports.
Second, Moran advocates the use of "arm's length" transac-
tions, i.e., General Motors engine output for its own cars would
not count, but only its other engine production. 90 No govern-
ment entity in any country collects such data.
87. Id. at 94-99.
88. See generally F.M. SCHERER & DAvm Ross, INDusRIAL MARKET STRuc-
TURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 73-79 (3rd ed. 1990) (discussing limitations
of SIC data).
89. For illustration, we constructed the weighted average four-firm concen-
tration ratio of the five digit "product classes" that constitute a four digit "in-
dustry"-machine tools, metal-cutting types--and also their (weighted)
standard deviation. The average is .51 while the standard deviation is .58.
This yields a coefficient of variation of 1.14, which indicates high variability
within the category. Defining the product somewhat differently, either in terms
of category or level of aggregation, may thus yield quite different concentration
estimates.
90. Whether arm's length transactions would yield higher or lower concen-




Unfortunately, the data problems of Moran's approach pale
by comparison with the conceptual difficulties. Concentration
ratios are meaningful only if they say something about competi-
tive conditions in an industry. For example, Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) Merger Guidelines of 198291, 198492 and 199293 do
not take published concentration ratios at face value for any
level of disaggregation. 94 In one alternative application, DOJ
defines a "market" by attempting to determine the smallest
group of products which, if their prices were raised together by
five percent, could hold that price without sales erosion within a
year. This recognizes that short-run substitution may come on
the demand side from products not included in a particular defi-
nition and, alternatively, that the supply of the product consid-
ered may sometimes be augmented quite easily by existing firms
not originally making them. Understandably, each "market"
must be handcrafted and subjective judgment plays a part; pub-
lished data seldom provide much help.95
One can certainly claim that critical levels of concentration
may differ for security-related output policies from those for an-
titrust policy as a whole, but we found no carefully defended
case in the new literature. Moran acknowledges that the level of
concentration he suggests might not be the appropriate general
standard, 96 and, indeed, for ordinary firm output, "4/50" is quite
a low level of concentration. 97 Interestingly, Moran fails to note
that a large amount of militarily relevant domestic output comes
91. 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982).
92. 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984).
93. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992).
94. See Steven C. Salop, Symposium On Mergers and Antitrust, 1 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 3 (1987); Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Merger Policy: Review
and Critique, 1 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 13 (1987); Franklin M. Fisher, Horizon-
tal Mergers: Triage and Treatment, 1 J. ECON. PERSPECTrVES 23 (1987); and
Richard Schmalensee, Horizontal Merger Policy: Problems and Changes, 1 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 41 (1987).
95. Considering the fruits of successful R&D illustrates the general prob-
lem. For example, to what "industry" is an innovation to be assigned? If the
innovation is a unique product, then by some definition a monopoly is immedi-
ate. If a new development is a proprietary production improvement, then the
new process must have some similarity to others.
96. Moran, supra note 82, at 83-84.
97. Id. In fact, under most circumstances, the Department of Justice
would find concentrations meeting Moran's suggested standard too low even to
warrant investigation. The Department of Justice employs the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of concentration rather than a four-firm concentration ratio,
but four-firm ratios of 50 typically correspond to H-H values of 800 to 1000;
official attention usually begins above that level. SCHERER & Ross, supra note
88, at 185.
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from industries with much higher concentration than his cut-
off.98 Yet, no dangers of purely domestic concentration are cited,
and no policies are put forward. Foreign monopoly is ostensibly
special on national security grounds. Yet domestic monopoly
also threatens national welfare; that is why the United States
has antitrust laws.99 On the other hand, we fail to see why the
apparent conditions for purely commercial exploitation, i.e., "ex-
cess profits," are more important in defense-related industries
than elsewhere, particularly given the considerable bargaining
power the U.S. government frequently brings to its purchases.
In the private sector, powerful buyers can offset seller monopoly
power, and this potential is recognized in the DOJ guidelines. 100
Moran also does not address the other major element of mo-
nopoly power besides concentration: barriers to entry and exit.
In the simplest theory of competition, concentration is usually
viewed as a necessary but insufficient condition for the exploita-
tion of market power. Fewness of incumbent sellers may tempt
them to explicitly or tacitly collude to raise prices. But unless
there are factors that render entry (and low cost exit) difficult,
attempts to raise price above cost simply provide an irresistible
lure bringing other sellers into the market. As noted, one DOJ
definition of the market takes short-run entry directly into ac-
count. In addition, it defines "easy" entry as a situation in which
the elevation of price over cost by as little as five percent would
be eroded by new sellers between one and two years.
While Moran's use of concentration as a guide to monopoly
power by competing firms may be suggestive if imprecise, the
use of a similar standard for nations - even if the exact num-
bers were different - strikes us as odd. The effects of tacit col-
lusion among nominally competing firms have contributed to the
development of rules of thumb. But nothing prevents govern-
ments from colluding explicitly and allowing or even fostering
collusion by firms in their own jurisdictions. Absent information
about political cohesion of the pertinent states or the extent of
98. Concentration in airframes or aircraft propulsion units, for example,
greatly exceeds the guideline. Moran's citation of overall defense supplier con-
centration as 54 percent in 1982, up from 33 percent in 1955, Moran, supra note
82, at 90, does not inform the present discussion.
What matters is concentration at the individual product level.
99. Domestic monopoly largely redistributes national income rather than
lowering it as foreign monopoly does. But this distinction scarcely stands out in
security related matters.
100. See Salop, supra note 94, at 8.
[Vol. 3:61
ECONOMIC ITERDEPEXDENdCE
effective cartel prevention abroad, the application of any "one
size fits all" standard seems difficult to defend. 10 1
Graham and Krugman take a somewhat different view of
the concentration in defense-related industries by implicitly
treating domestic and foreign firms similarly.'0 2 They suggest
that the Sherman Act 103 might be amended to be especially
stringent for goods and services "critical to the national de-
fense."I04 The allowable share for the largest firm "would surely
be less than 100 percent but probably more than 25 percent".10 5
This rule differs conceptually and not just numerically from that
offered by Moran. 10 6 From the rule's context, it appears that
Graham and Krugman would look only at concentration in the
U.S. market in making their determinations. But ignoring bar-
riers to entry in this situation is even less defensible than when
the global market is considered because suppliers not currently
serving the U.S. market might be able to substitute quickly for
current sources if the latter's performance proved to be unsatis-
factory. This is just the sort of entry considered in the DOJ
Guidelines.
Moreover, both Moran and Graham-Krugman should con-
sider that in some industries the wait could be short enough to
be tolerable, even if the measured concentration ratio is high. In
particular, intra-industry reallocation of production should be
considered. Finally, neither Moran nor Graham and Krugman
consider an important recent concern of antitrust policy: econo-
101. Furthermore, how are member states of the European Community to
be counted? The overwhelming part of global capacity in high technology is
located in the United States, Japan, or the Community.
102. See generally GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 81, at 139-61.
103. The Sherman Act of 1890 provides the foundation for U.S. antitrust
law. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890Xcurrent version at 15
U.S.C.S. §§ 1-3). Section one of the Sherman Act states that "every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce of the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal.. . ." Id. Section two declares that "every person who shall monopo-
lize or attempt to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a felony .....
Id.
The Clayton Act of 1914 covers specific firm practices that can be found
illegal. Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1988)).
104. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 81, at 151.
105. Id.
106. If the schemes could be applied to the same defined market, the numer-
ical benchmark would differ significantly. If the largest firm had 25 percent,
and the four firm ratio was only 50, the next three firms in the four firm ratio
could have an average of only a little more than 8 percent apiece.
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mies of scale.107 What price in overall efficiency should one pay
to decrease top level concentration?
B. DISCRETON IN A NEW PROCEDURE
Graham and Ebert propose yet another approach to the ap-
plication of competition policy to defense-related industries: 0
the development of what amounts to a U.S. version of the Brit-
ish Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 109 Incoming foreign
direct investors would have their proposed activities vetted as
part of a process involving the Justice Department and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission so that competition issues receive thor-
ough consideration. They propose three screens for an
acquisition above a certain threshold of firms holding classified
contracts with the Departments of Defense or Energy: 1) would
the acquisition affect the ability of the armed services to buy de-
sirable quality at attractive prices? 2) would the sources for de-
fense purchases be significantly reduced? and 3) would rivalry in
R&D be significantly diminished?" o This is "rule of reason," sit-
uation-specific, antitrust policy in a fairly pure form."' No real
economic guidelines such as those now governing ordinary
mergers are offered.
Another subjective criterion would apply to defense-rele-
vant mergers or acquisitions, regardless of whether classified ac-
tivity is involved and whether or not one of the firms is foreign.
Authorities may have "serious reservations about a domestic
takeover of that firm if the bidder lacked experience in defense
procurement, had a history of less than satisfactory contractual
dealings with the U.S. government, or perhaps was a corporate
raider with a reputation for dismembering its trophies after con-
cluding a takeover". 112 The authority would probably have
strong concerns about a takeover from a firm located in a nation
that is a "likely adversary" of the United States, as well as from
107. For a discussion of economies of scale as a competition policy issue, see
generally Graham & Ebert, supra note 54.
108. Id. at 256-61.
109. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, MERGERS, A GUIDE TO PROCEDURES UNDER
THE FAIR TRADING ACT OF 1973 25-28 (London: H.M.S.O., 1989).
110. Graham & Ebert, supra note 54, at 261-66.
111. Early in the history of U.S. antitrust, certain practices, i.e. most ex-
plicit agreements among nominal competitors, were found to be illegal per se as
violations of Section I of the Sherman Act. Other challengeable behavior was
considered under a "rule of reason" standard. The Clayton Act of 1914 employs
the "reasonableness" standard explicitly. See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 88,
at 317-325.
112. Graham & Ebert, supra note 54, at 265.
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one in a friendly or non-aligned nation if the firm has a "reputa-
tion for imposing its interpretations of strict neutrality on its
domestically-owned firms". 113
The Exon-Florio Amendment 1 4 gives the President the au-
thority to block foreign acquisitions on national security
grounds. We fear that revisions inspired by Graham and Ebert,
although clearly intended to be friendly additions to competition
policy, might be construed virtually as a mandate to find and
keep domestic suppliers for the Defense Department. The avail-
ability of so many unweighted criteria could provide a promising
avenue of attack for domestic protectionists. But this is specula-
tion. Uncertainty about just how decision-making would actu-
ally be made means that even the general impact of the policy
innovation cannot be confidently predicted.
C. STRONG-ARMING FOREIGN MONOPOLISTS
Thus far, the discussion has focused mainly on alternative
measures of probable competitiveness and their use to bar in-
creases in market power based on acquisition. This leaves open
the question of what to do about suppliers who already have mo-
nopoly power. In the more activist tradition of U.S. antitrust,
divestiture has been proposed as a solution.115 This policy direc-
tion seems to be favored by Graham and Krugman, 116 although
only in extreme conditions. But such an approach, which has
actually been used very rarely in American history, can feasibly
apply only to firms already in U.S. jurisdiction. 117
What if a monopolist sells from a foreign base? Moran
clearly prefers the encouragement of such exporters to become
direct investors because of the leverage it gives the U.S. govern-
ment: a supply cut-off by an exporter at its government's direc-
tion becomes instead an extraterritorial dispute. 118 The United
States has been the aggressive party in such disputes countless
113. Id.
114. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(d) (West Supp. 1993).
115. See e.g., CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANrimusT PoLcy: AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYsIs (1959).
116. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 81, at 153.
117. A measure as radical as break-up can clearly take place only where
jurisdiction is firmly established. Moreover, such restructuring is very costly to
litigate and involves considerable risk. The courts have ordered restructuring
only eight times since 1950 in monopolization cases (of the 33 ordered since
1890). As Scherer and Ross have argued, "[t]ime and market forces are power-
ful restructurers - more powerful than U.S. antitrust has ever been." SCHERER
& Ross, supra note 88, at 482.
118. Moran, supra, note 82, at 82-84.
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times in the post-war period, usually directing foreign subsidiar-
ies to respect American policy concerning such issues as anti-
trust, trading with communist countries, or the selection of
national sources for finance. 119 Such practice outraged our al-
lies, and even the Canadian government passed blocking legisla-
tion.120 With the volume of direct investment in the United
States now approximately of the same magnitude as such U.S.
investment abroad, the shoe can be expected to be on the other
foot with increasing frequency. This reality should give impetus
to the search for an international agreement restraining extra-
territorial practices.
Graham and Krugman emphasize fall-back more than lev-
erage. They favor obliging foreign monopoly exporters either to
license U.S. firms or to integrate forward into the U.S. market,
perhaps with requirements about U.S.-based R&D and the em-
ployment of American nationals in certain echelons of the sub-
sidiary's operations. 121 Moran and Graham-Krugman agree
that entry should be denied if access to the U.S. market on ac-
ceptable terms cannot be negotiated, and that the United States
should then attempt to duplicate the monopolized product.' 22
To do this, of course, it must maintain a posture of comprehen-
sive scientific, technological, and manufacturing excellence.
Graham and Krugman regard such limited "performance re-
quirements" as reasonable for all nations; 123 in fact, they advo-
cate enshrining them in an international agreement.124 Yet
notice how difficult it is to distinguish in practice between a pol-
icy designed to assure and a policy designed to advantage. With
so many "strategic trade" advocates willing to accept policies
that seem suited to their perspective, we think at the very least
119. Id. at 65. See also JOHN H. DUNNING, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THE GLOBAL ECONoMY 580-83 (1993).
120. A. EDWARD SAFARIAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND PUBLIC Poi-
Icy: A STUDY OF THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 124 (1993).
121. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 81, at 103-04, 151-55.
122. Moran also strongly advocates a "national security tariff" aimed at
those who use "targeting through predatory pricing to achieve their goals. Mo-
ran, supra note 82, at 84-88. He implicitly endorses greater vigilance in the
enforcement of U.S. antidumping laws, despite abundant evidence from Rich-
ard Boltuck and Robert Litan that 1) successful international "targeting" has
involved an unknown, but perhaps very minor, use of predatory pricing and 2)
the antidumping laws typically employ an indefensibly protectionist exercise of
administrative discretion to assist industries that fail in international competi-
tion. See RIcHARD BOLTUCK & ROBERT E. LrrAN, DOWN IN THE Dumps: ADMINIS-
TRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAws (1991).
123. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 81, at 154.
124. Id. at 155-58.
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an additional proviso is needed. Increased international cooper-
ation demands that any performance requirements clearly aim
only at minimizing the defense risks resulting from a reliance on
foreigners. No uncompensated commercial advantages should
accrue. The United States might be understandably anxious to
gloss over such distinctions; it has more bargaining power for
access to its market than any other single state.125 But with the
civilian component of dual-use technologies already dominant
and increasing, only very carefully crafted restrictions on per-
formance requirements could prevent cooperative intentions
from resulting in acrimony.
D. PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND ESPIONAGE
Discussions of monopoly in largely commercial, or "commer-
cial-like," terms ignore the specific characteristics of other coun-
tries. The attempt to find one size that fits all may be highly
useful as a heuristic; we can scarcely imagine it in practice. The
historically warranted special trust that the United States has
placed in the United Kingdom and especially in Canada as de-
fense suppliers makes us doubt whether it makes sense, even in
developing policy schematics, for the United States to treat most
foreign countries as essentially the same. Specifically, we think
the differing willingness of countries to engage in extraterrito-
rial manipulation of subsidiary behavior in the United States
provides some grounds for differential treatment of direct inves-
tors of different nationalities. And it suggests the potential for
bilateral agreement on extraterritoriality.
Historically, of course, the United States has been one of the
most notable employers of extraterritoriality, 126 and we strongly
endorse multilateral disarmament in this area. We endorse the
explicitly home-country sensitive approach outlined by Graham
and Ebert who would require careful investigation of any acqui-
sition "when a foreign bidder is from a nation deemed to be a
potential adversary of the United States or from a 'country of
concern'" 127 under the Export Administration Act. 128 This is es-
125. Just how Europe will handle such performance requirements cannot
presently be descried because of continuing incongruities between transna-
tional economic cooperation and considerable independence in national defense.
126. See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 81, at 133.
127. Graham & Ebert, supra note 54, at 264.
128. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401 et seq (1993)). The United States
maintains an extensive export control system. In the mid-1980s, about half of
all U.S. exports required a (non-trivial) license. Since the end of the Cold War,
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pecially important for the purposes of avoiding espionage and
assuring compliance with U.S. export controls.
One of the first results of the Exon-Florio Amendment 129
was the blockage of an acquisition by the PRC's China National
Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) of an
American aerospace components firm, Mamco Manufacturing
Company, which would have allowed the free flow of otherwise
unapproved exports.' 30 This demonstrates both the flexibility of
Exon-Florio in its present form, and that Graham and Ebert's
proposed "potential adversary" criterion could be variously con-
strued. There are those who would broaden Exon-Florio to in-
clude threats to national objectives such as industrial
competitiveness, but that sort of inclusiveness would basically
cover exactly those nations with whom technological cooperation
has the most to offer for U.S. objectives.
As an example of the problems we see with the other analy-
ses, consider the following case. Suppose a foreign firm develops
a monopoly in a particular product deemed vital for U.S. de-
fense; this might even happen subsequent to a compulsory pe-
riod of U.S. production following American subsidization of the
development of the essential technology. The United States has
a number of options. Assume, for example, that stockpiling or
extensive inventories are feasible in the context of a close and
confident working relationship with the home country govern-
ment concerning issues such as extraterritoriality and coopera-
tion under the Defense Production Act. 131 Assume further that
the United States has the capacity to quickly duplicate the prod-
uct, a capacity that would be reflected in a DOJ-type concentra-
tion measure and which may be quite likely because U.S. firms
would almost certainly have been active in the original consor-
tium. In this case, perhaps nothing should be done at all. At-
tempting to force either the licensing of a U.S.-owned firm
operating on American soil or foreign integration by the foreign
producer might well be seen abroad as giving the United States
U.S. concerns have shifted from keeping goods and technology out of communist
hands to issues connected with nuclear and biological warfare proliferation.
Most western nations have somewhat similar controls, but they are imperfectly
coordinated with those of the United States. See J. DAVID RIcHARDSON, SIZING
Up U.S. EXPORT DISINCENTrIVES 34-38 (1993).
129. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (West Supp. 1993).
130. Graham & Ebert, supra note 54, at 252; see also TysoN, supra note 55,
at 147.
131. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061-2170. The law allows the U.S. government
preferential access to the firm's production capacity in times of national emer-
gency. See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 81, at 104-05, 122, 152-53.
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an unwarranted advantage. Moreover, a refusal by the foreign
firm to cooperate would, in the schemes advocated by Moran and
by Graham and Krugman, apparently necessitate independent
U.S. production which could result in massive economic waste as
well as increased international acrimony.
V. A POLICY AGENDA
We have criticized some of the specifics of recent sugges-
tions to reconcile U.S. R&D, trade, and investment policy with a
more symmetrically interdependent post-Cold War world.
Nonetheless, our own policy analysis rests on the same basic as-
sumption: the most serious challenge to U.S. national security
comes from an excess of autarchic impulses and coolness toward
interdependence - not the reverse. Moreover, several of our
suggestions strongly parallel the recommendations of the other
analysts.
Most generally, the American economy and American secur-
ity will benefit from two sets of actions by the United States.
One set should be proposed for multilateral assent and imple-
mentation by the major industrial countries, perhaps in a G-7 or
G-8 framework. The second set involves unilateral measures by
the United States with a fixed deadline for reciprocity by others.
Reciprocity would lead to continuation, and lack thereof to re-
consideration. A lack of agreement and reciprocity by others
surely is a possibility. We turn to that possibility after introduc-
ing our recommended initiatives.
A. MULTILATERAL INITIATWVES
First, we favor further international antitrust cooperation
of the kind recently initiated between the United States and the
European Community. As explained earlier, only where collu-
sion is carefully monitored do concentration ratios have a com-
mon meaning. Increased cooperation on competition matters
with the third member of the triad, Japan, should be a top
priority.
Second, the United States should seek agreement with
other countries aimed at minimizing the extraterritorial reach of
national law. Past U.S. claims, many of them driven by Cold
War tactics at variance with those of its allies, have generated
spectacular acrimony. The United States should recognize that
the changed international situation has removed much of the ra-
tionale for previous intrusion abroad, while the large stock of
FDI in the United States could provide a source of future diffi-
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culty if understandings are not reached. Effective agreement
could remove much of the current anxiety about FDI in defense-
related industry. Some ongoing dispute resolution mechanism
would also certainly be useful.
Third, the industrialized countries should agree that gov-
ernment-sanctioned R&D and procurement activity should not
discriminate on the basis of nationality of controlling ownership.
If a government wishes to subsidize private firms, or simply to
allow them exemption from the competition laws in spheres
such as joint research, these policies should aim at the efficient
improvement of economic welfare and not dispute-inducing na-
tional advantage. Any national advantage should be confined to
the spillover from nationally-located activity to the larger econ-
omy. We see no problem with allowing governments to specify
periods of national production growing out of voluntary partici-
pation in R&D consortia as a quid pro quo for subsidization.
B. UNILATERAL MEASURES
In addition to the multilateral steps initiated above, we ad-
vocate the following unilateral measures. First, while we think
the Bush Administration administered the Exon-Florio provi-
sions prudently, 132 we are unsure about the Clinton approach,
and the fundamental language may yet provide grounds for
abuse. Exon-Florio should mandate that the Executive consider
only national security defined narrowly.
132. Our view differs from that of Tyson. Tyson cites data indicating that
the Exon-Florio process received 700 notifications of proposed foreign acquisi-
tions between October, 1988 and the summer of 1992. Of the 600 actual acqui-
sitions that took place over that period, only 14 were subject to investigation
and only the Chinese case mentioned in the text was blocked. Tyson cites with
approval another case in which an American semiconductor-photolithography
firm, Perkin-Elmer, was "saved" from acquisition by its only major competitor,
Nikon, because of government cooperation with American industry to find an-
other buyer. Tyson's two suggested principles for handling foreign acquisitions
are 1) to use national ownership or local production "to enhance national control
over suppliers regardless of their nationality" and 2) to "seek a diversity of sup-
pliers to maintain a competitive global supply base." TYSON, supra note 55, at
147-48. In our view, these principles are excessively vague. For example, Ty-
son notes with alarm that the committee responsible for administering Exon-
Florio approved an acquisition of Semi-Gas Systems by Nippon Sanso which
raised the former firm's share from 2 to 40 percent. Id. Tyson does not report,
however, that the acquisition was also reviewed by the Department of Justice,
which would have properly considered competition in a global context. See Gra-
ham & Ebert, supra note 54, at 247. Most fundamentally, we differ from Tyson
in finding little significance in national ownership per se. Tyson's views take




Second, antitrust expertise should be part of the Exon-
Florio process from the very beginning because of the need for
an understanding of competitive conditions both in the United
States and globally. An efficient process thus requires that se-
curity and competition issues be considered simultaneously in a
joint process involving both defense and competition
authorities. 133
Third, the United States should far more carefully monitor
the location of production and the competitive situation of all
suppliers to the national security effort; present tracking seems
woefully inadequate with respect to subcontractors below the
first tier.134 In a very few instances the United States might
interfere with purely market decisions solely for logistical
reasons.135
Fourth, the United States should explore reduction of extra-
territoriality through bilateral negotiations. Because we believe
that the administration of Exon-Florio should remain sensitive
to home-country policies, the United States should have consid-
erable leverage in such discussions, which must pay great atten-
tion to export policies and their enforcement. 136
Fifth, participation by foreign-owned firms should be al-
lowed in R&D consortia approved or subsidized by the U.S. gov-
ernment. 137 If it is deemed appropriate to insure that
cooperating partners exploit the results of their efforts in the
133. Legislation by Rep. Philip R. Sharp (D.-Ind.), H.R. 2631, 102nd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991), illustrates that such integration is now taking place along lines
suggested by Graham & Krugman. See GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 81, at
154.
134. Id. at 108.
135. See generally MARTIN LIBiciI, JACK NUNN, & WILLIAM TAYLOR, U.S. IN-
DUSTRIAL BASE DEPENDENCYNULNERABILITY: PHASE 2 - ANALYSIS (1987); ER-
LAND H. HEGINBOTHAM ET AL., DEPENDENCE OF U.S. DEFENSE SYSTEMS ON
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGIES (1990); DEPT. OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF INDUSTRIAL RE-
SOURCE ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN SUBCONTRACTOR BASE: A STUDY OF THREE U.S. NAVY WEAPON SYS-
TEMS (1992).
136. See, e.g., Robert T. Kudrle, Regulating Multinational Enterprises in
North America, in MULTINATIONALS IN NORTH AMERICA (Lorraine Eden ed.,
forthcoming 1994); Ellen L. Frost & Edward M. Graham, The New Global Envi-
ronment, the Globalization of the Defense Industries, and National Security:
With Special Reference to Canada in the Context of NAFTA, in MULTINATIONALS
IN NORTH AMERICA, supra (manuscripts on file with author) (suggesting in-
creased harmonization of investment and trade policies within North America).
137. Tyson's recent review of Sematech lauds its performance and does not
recommend expanding its membership, or that of any similar future consortia,
to foreign-owned firms. TYSON, supra note 55, at 151-54. Tyson offers no de-
fense for the exclusion of foreign owned firms.
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United States as a condition for government subsidy, such re-
quirements should apply equally to all firms, regardless of
ownership. 138
Sixth, we think that both U.S. vulnerability and the re-
sponse to it should be decided carefully on a case by case basis.
In particular, we fear that the use of conventional concentration
ratios (for either all activity or "arm's length" transactions) as
the main criterion for measuring vulnerability should be
avoided. The use of any simple but conservative rule could re-
sult in a large amount of unnecessary protection - exactly the
outcome that it is meant to avoid.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our policy suggestions grow directly from the analysis
presented earlier. The case remains unmade that purely com-
mercial monopoly power is more important in security-related
industries than elsewhere. Each of the special problems of for-
eignness needs special attention, however. First, national loca-
tion of production may sometimes be important for purely
logistical reasons. Second, the United States must be satisfied
that the probable leakage of security-sensitive information be no
greater from foreign-owned than from U.S.-owned firms - and
that both be satisfactory. Finally, the American government
must also be assured that foreign-owned firms in security-re-
lated industries be acceptably amenable to U.S. government in-
fluence and acceptably free from foreign direction. We may
differ most from other analysts in stressing that this absence of
"foreignness" or the dangers from it must be considered in a
number of dimensions that allow no simple formulation.
We recognize that many will be skeptical about the extent to
which the lines of policy we suggest will be accepted, complied
with, and reciprocated. The skeptics have significant historical
grounds for their doubts. Yet there are compelling grounds for
credible U.S. advocacy of the extensive set of policies we have set
forth. Explicit commitment to our policy agenda with clear ex-
138. Some analysts, such as Graham and Krugman, have advocated a study
of the alleged "hollowing out" phenomenon: technology-rich U.S. firms acquired
by (frequently Japanese) firms with a subsequent transfer of most of the tech-
nological capacity to the home country. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 81, at
117-18. Such research could be valuable, but any results seeming to demon-
strate the phenomenon should be interpreted with care. Even where such firms
are valuable, partly because of U.S. taxpayer subsidies to education or R&D, it
does not automatically follow that foreign production based on U.S. ideas low-
ers U.S. welfare by comparison with alternatives.
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pectations and a set timetable during which that commitment
will be sustained is far preferable to case after case of bilateral
friction that erodes confidence in an interdependence framework
for managing militarily relevant high technology. Under our
proposals, the United States would present a relatively clear
program that differs from the current American practice of pro-
viding excessive "wiggle room" to others, 18 9 and that has been
marked by reversals based on executive-congressional tension,
struggles among executive departments, special interest polit-
ical influence, and electoral temptations.140 Advocacy of general
principles avoids unhelpful targeting of particular nations for
punitive action, but leaves open the prospect for American policy
differentiated between cooperative and resistant foreign govern-
ments and firms. Following a set period, the United States
would continue cooperation with firms and governments exhibit-
ing reciprocal behavior, while such cooperation would cease or
be sharply diminished with others based on an index of the
shortfall from reciprocity.
Lack of foreign adherence and reciprocity so long as we fol-
low a prudent timetable has at most modest costs. Lack of suc-
cess with our policy agenda could propel nationalist industrial
policy steps or security adaptations far more radical than the
suggestions we have criticized. The American political economy
is not rushing to take profound steps in that direction at this
time, so the opportunity cost of our positive interdependence
proposals cannot be great.
Our recommendations for trade, investment, and R&D pol-
icy grow from the conviction that the United States should con-
139. Section 301 of the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act, "Super 301,"
which expired in 1990 was merely the most recent in a series of legislative ini-
tiatives that mandated investigations and discussions on the part of the execu-
tive with trading partners on matters of market access and related matters.
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title III, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (codi-
fied as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)). After breakdown of the U.S.-Ja-
pan trade talks in February 1994 it was widely believed that the Clinton
Administration would reinstate "Super 301" by executive order. Bob Davis &
Jacob M. Schlesinger, U.S. Plans Sanctions Move as Talks With Japan Fail,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1994, at A3. Such legislation has always allowed for Pres-
idential discretion that is typically used to avoid imposing sanctions on foreign-
ers. While part of this can be rationalized on "good cop, bad cop" grounds, we
think that in some areas, such as the issues discussed in the text, executive
discretion should be reduced.
140. In the famous Toshiba case, Arjay Associates, Inc. v. Bush, 891 F.2d
894 (Fed. Cir. 1989), virtually all of these factors were at play. The case in-
volved sanctions that were leveled against the Japanese firm Toshiba Machine
Company for failing to prevent a high-tech transfer to the former Soviet Union.
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sciously choose to abandon or considerably modify several of its
long-standing security policy objectives and firmly embrace a
more equal partnership with other major industrial countries.
Such an approach holds the potential for greater global prosper-
ity and more efficient U.S. defense expenditures, without sacri-
ficing massive coalition supremacy over any potential military
opponent. Perhaps most important, it may be the only path
open to the United States that combines long-term political and
economic viability - both at home and abroad.
